A Human Being as a Part of the Security Control System at the Airport  by Skorupski, Jacek & Uchroński, Piotr
 Procedia Engineering  134 ( 2016 )  291 – 300 
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
1877-7058 © 2016 Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of the organizing committee of Transbaltica 2015
doi: 10.1016/j.proeng.2016.01.010 
ScienceDirect
9th International Scientific Conference Transbaltica 2015 
A Human Being as a Part of the Security Control System 
 at the Airport 
Jacek Skorupskia*, Piotr Uchrońskib 
aWarsaw University of Technology, ul. Koszykowa 75, 00-662 Warszawa, Poland 
bUpper Silesian Aviation Group, al. Korfantego 38, 40-161 Katowice, Poland  
Abstract 
The passenger and baggage security in airport screening system is one of the most important factors that determine air transport 
safety and security. It prevents objects and materials that could be used to commit an act of unlawful interference from being 
placed on board an aircraft. The security screening system consists of x-ray screening devices, walk-through metal detectors and 
specialised software. However, a key element of the security screening system is the human – the security screener (SSc). The 
equipment and software helps the screener to find prohibited items, but also detects and records his/her errors. The whole security 
control point (SCP) can be regarded as a complex socio-technical system. It’s effectiveness is dependent, inter alia, on the type of 
x-ray devices used, a variant of SCP organisation or the technical condition of the equipment, but mainly on the quality of the 
security screeners’ work. Special attention is paid to the types of errors and their frequency. We analyze the quantitative 
relationships between types of errors and also between the frequency of errors and the frequency of virtual threat images 
projection (TIP). This last technology is a kind of intelligent support system and at the same time verifies the screener’s work. 
The study was based on measurements under real conditions at the Katowice-Pyrzowice International Airport. In the framework 
of this research two basic types of errors made by SSc were identified. The results show that the number of errors is dependent 
from the frequency of the stimulus, represented by TIP images. As a result, it was possible to determine the recommended 
frequency of threat images projections. The study is supplemented by a comparison of the screeners’ effectiveness in laboratory 
conditions against real conditions, while working at the security control point. 
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1. Introduction 
The airport security depends on many factors, which are discussed in more detail in the literature (Gerstenfeld, 
Berger 2011, Uchroński 2011, Skorupski, Uchroński 2014a). In the most general terms, these factors can be divided 
into technical (Skorupski, Uchroński 2014b) and human ones. Humans play different roles in an airport management 
system (AMS) and appear at many different levels of its functioning. At the strategic level, they establish 
regulations and legal standards. At the tactical level, a human being assumes the role of the organiser and controller 
(supervisor) of the activities carried out by all services, whereas at the operational level, a human being takes on the 
role of a person screening passengers and their luggage as well as patrolling airport premises in search of people 
who might have unlawfully entered the restricted area at an airport. On the other hand, it is also the human being 
that constitutes the main source of risk, which is to be counteracted by airport security (Price, Forrest 2013). 
Security screeners (SSc) performing their tasks with the use of x-ray equipment will be of interest in this paper. 
Typically, when evaluating this kind of cabin and hold baggage security control we pay particular attention to the 
technical equipment – the type and functions of the device used. However, it is worth noting that the assessment of the 
contents of baggage is the responsibility of the human in most cases. The ability to identify prohibited items, and thus 
the safety of passengers depends largely on his or her experience and skills. Although the specialised equipment for the 
screening of people and baggage that security screeners have at their disposal is becoming increasingly more advanced, 
it will always be the human being who will constitute a link between technology and a decision-making process, 
whereas equipment will always be merely an element supporting a human being in his/her work. 
This paper analyses some aspects of the activity of a human being, i.e. a security screener, with regard to that 
screener’s effectiveness in eliminating threats. We will focus particularly on the types and frequency of errors made 
by SSc, because they allow us to determine the effectiveness level of baggage security screening.  
2. Security screener as an element of an airport security system – the literature review 
The role that the human factor plays in civil aviation, in particular in civil aviation security, became a subject of 
research not long ago, i.e. in the 1970s. The events that occurred in the US on 11 September 2001 gave a direct 
impetus to the intensification of activities and to creating new, more restrictive regulations (Seidenstat, Splane 
2009). Attention was also directed to training the personnel in threat detection skills and in reacting appropriately to 
any kinds of non-standard behaviour on the part of passengers (Alards-Tomalin et al. 2014, Dąbrowska 2011). This 
is because human error, which is caused by deliberate action or deficiencies in training, may have catastrophic 
consequences for an airport, a carrier and passengers (Price, Forrest 2013). The awareness that a human being is a 
factor that may significantly influence the level of air transport security causes this factor to be treated with special 
care in civil aviation security. This care is manifested, for example, in the checks that are carried out by national 
quality auditors, who secretly test airport security systems. These tests involve, among other things, provocation, i.e. 
an attempt to bring a prohibited or dangerous item hidden in the luggage on board an aircraft. The results of such 
tests provide a basis for evaluating the work of a particular security screener (Schwaninger et al. 2004).  
The mechanism of the civil aviation security system is based on the principle of limited trust. Any activities that 
are undertaken with regard to a passenger and his/her luggage are aimed to detect prohibited items, which a 
passenger-terrorist could use to commit an act of unlawful interference (Butler, Poole 2002). Apart from the bags 
content knowledge, a screener’s psychophysical abilities that allow him/her to effectively carry out his/her tasks are 
also important. A person who is unable to distinguish between colours or has significantly reduced visual acuity 
cannot work as a security screener, if only because of the very nature of the image that is generated by an x-ray 
source (Flitton et al. 2013). What is also important for this job is screeners’ experience because it allows them to 
carry out their tasks independently and effectively as well as an attitude that guarantees that they will work 
conscientiously and diligently.  
Depending on whether we are dealing with hand luggage or checked-in baggage screening technology is a bit 
different. The screening of checked baggage is largely carried out automatically (Wells, Bradley 2012). A human 
being, however, constitutes an important element of this process since the ability to think analytically and assess the 
risk while considering all the factors that are specific to a particular case makes a human an integral part of the 
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security system. On the other hand, the effectiveness of an airport security system, including the checked baggage 
screening system, depends on a human being’s psychophysical abilities, level of training and motivation. 
Schwaninger et al. (2004) pointed out that a security screening system at an airport is as effective as the employees 
who carry out the screening. The paper presents two methods of testing security screeners’ effectiveness: the 
prohibited items test (PIT) and the object recognition test (ORT). These methods are aimed to determine the 
relationship between the type of a prohibited item, its location in the baggage and the possibility that it will be 
detected by a security screener. The authors of the present paper expand this approach by directing more attention to 
the characteristics of a particular security screener him-/herself than to the baggage he/she is inspecting. The article 
by Feng et al. (2009) presents an attempt at analysing the relationship between the reliability of a baggage screening 
system and its effectiveness. Two kinds of errors committed by security screeners were taken into account and 
principles of conduct were proposed for a two-level screening system. However, the assumptions that were made 
about the probability of security screeners committing an error were unrealistic. In the present paper the authors 
examine the actual probabilities that were obtained based on measurements. 
In their paper, Graves et al. (2011) analysed the factors that influence the effectiveness of baggage and passenger 
screening systems at an airport while taking ac-count of the fact that such systems should be designed by 
considering security screeners as a critical factor in their performance. McCarley’s (2009) paper points to the 
important role of any kind of aids, even minor ones, that indicate that special attention should be paid to a particular 
item of luggage in increasing the effectiveness of security screeners’ work. In their article, Wales et al. (2009) used 
the Threat Image Projection (TIP) system to assess a security screener’s competence. A linear relationship between 
the response time and the number of images of prohibited items that had been detected was established. The authors 
of the present paper also employ the statistics of the TIP system to evaluate a screener’s experience, which makes it 
possible to achieve the paper’s aim, i.e. to quantitatively determine a given security screener’s effectiveness in 
detecting prohibited items.  
When analysing the literature with regard to particular research methods one can notice several trends. Many of 
the relationships that exist within the analysed system are intuitive and subjective in character and they cannot be 
unequivocally described. It is therefore necessary that decision-making processes should be analysed in the context 
of uncertainty (Dubois, Prade 1992). As a result, fuzzy methods or methods using the rough set theory must be 
adopted (Greco et al. 2001). Wu and Mengersen (2013) suggest that there is a need to analyse airport security 
systems by adopting a two-criterion approach, i.e. by taking both the processing time (throughput) and the 
effectiveness of security screening into account. Problems of this kind are interdisciplinary. The use of domain 
experts can be very helpful in such situations. Methods of multi-criteria group evaluation of variants under 
uncertainty (Skorupski 2014) can be useful to ensure the effectiveness of inference on the basis of free expert 
opinions. The processing time and security costs have been analysed, for instance in (Hainen et al. 2013; 
Kirschenbaum 2013; Stewart, Mueller 2014). This paper presents some measurements and analysis that may help in 
describing the second of these criteria.  
3. Security screeners’ errors and effectiveness of the security control system 
The effectiveness of baggage control process performed remotely by the screener is affected by numerous 
factors. They can be divided into two main groups. The first one is related to the class of x-ray device used and was 
analysed in (Skorupski, Uchroński 2014b). The second group is related to the human – the security screener and can 
include: 
• an overall assessment of the screener’s potential, depending on his/her experience, level of training and the 
overall attitude to his/her duties: restrictive or lenient,  
• number of errors committed during baggage control,  
• organizational factors, characterizing the degree of screener’s involvement throughout the whole baggage 
security control process.  
In this paper we deal with factors from the second group and in particular with the issue of screeners’ errors. This 
paper is a continuation of our previous work (Skorupski, Uchroński 2014c). We have extended the study by the 
analysis of the impact of screener’s experience on the response time to the displayed TIP image, and also we have 
made a comparison of the SSc effectiveness in the real world to the laboratory conditions.  
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In general, it can be stated that there are several groups of causes contributing to the errors made by the operator 
of an intelligent telematic system, an example of which is TIP, considered in this paper. These include: 
• baggage characteristics: the complexity of the evaluated image, orientation of a prohibited object in relation to 
the screener and the degree of overlap between the different images adjacent to the forbidden item (Michel et 
al. 2010), 
• technical factors: the type and condition of the telematic support equipment that generate and transmit x-ray 
images (Kirschenbaum et al. 2012), 
• environmental factors: workplace organisation, lighting, temperature, 
• individual short-term factors: nervousness, lack of sleep, weariness (resulting from the monotony of work and 
lack of incentives), fatigue (due to the length of the work, work at night or due to an excess of stimuli) (Wang, 
Chuang 2014), 
• individual long-term factors: level of training, experience, security culture (Stroeve et al. 2011). 
Within the research, measurements were carried out at Katowice-Pyrzowice International Airport from January to 
April 2014. Types and frequency of the errors were specified. We have established that screeners make the 
following types of errors: 
• They do not point (notice) the virtual prohibited item located in the image of the scanned baggage. We called 
it the type A error. It is a very worrying situation. Because if the screener did not notice the image of the 
virtual prohibited item it can be assumed with the same probability that they will not notice a real prohibited 
item. A large number of such mistakes would mean that the whole security system of the airport is of poor 
quality. This is because the main purpose of the baggage security control, i.e. detecting the prohibited item, is 
not fulfilled. 
• They point as dangerous the bags which in fact contain neither a virtual, nor a real prohibited item. We called 
it type B errors. This situation can be interpreted in two ways. We can assume that the operator had (due to the 
analysis of the image displayed on the screen of the x-ray scanner) reasonable concern and suspicion as to the 
content of baggage so he/she showed alertness, which undoubtedly is a positive feature. However, it is also 
possible that in order to get a good rating, he/she marked automatically, and without a thorough analysis of the 
image, many scanned baggage as suspicious. 
From the security point of view, the most important are the type A errors. The essence of the security control 
carried out by an operator with the use of x-ray scanners is the ability to recognise the images of the prohibited 
items. The number of type A errors is the measure of this ability. In turn, type B errors can disorganize the 
screeners’ work, resulting in the need for very frequent manual control of the baggage. This reduces the throughput 
of such a system, but more important is that a large number of false alarms weakens the screener’s vigilance. 
4. The dependence of errors on the screener’s experience 
The theoretical knowledge that screeners acquire during training in civil aviation security establishes certain 
frameworks and patterns which they will use when performing their duties. However, just like in any other 
occupation that requires employees to operate equipment, assess the situation, relate facts to one another or make 
decisions, one cannot become theoretically prepared for all possible situations that can occur in real life. This is 
particularly true of non-standard situations or emergencies (Bazargan, Guzhva 2011; Malakis et al. 2010a; 
Schwaninger et al. 2004). Such situations require solving unusual decision-making problems and being able to 
assess possible options for action in a factual, substantive and calm way as well as in the context of the current legal 
and organisational regulations or infrastructural limitations. A screener acquires these skills over time while working 
at a security screening checkpoint, thus gaining experience (Fruhen et al. 2014). 
It is very difficult to assess experience of a security screener, i.e. the extent to which he/she is able to work 
independently or even supervise and train new employees. This is because it is a subjective matter and, additionally, 
an employee’s performance depends on his/her personality as well as his/her ability to work in a group; therefore, it 
is hard to carry out an unambiguous assessment in this area (Malakis et al. 2010b). 
The effectiveness of security screeners in detecting prohibited items was measured during the period from March 
2013 to February 2014. The statistics of errors that had been recorded by baggage screening equipment with the TIP 
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system were used for this purpose. Measurements were made of the number of TIP images which were not 
recognised by a security screener (type A error) and the number of identifications of a prohibited item that was not 
really there (type B error).  
The idea of TIP system is to project a virtual prohibited item on the image of the piece of baggage being 
screened. A database of images of items prohibited for air transport, that is included in TIP software, contains 
different images, depending on whether we are dealing with a hand baggage or a hold baggage. In the latter case, all 
kinds of explosives and pyrotechnics are prohibited. The catalogue of prohibited items is much broader in case of 
hand baggage. It includes also objects with sharp ends and liquids. Colloquially, we simply call these images TIPs, 
and in the situation when the system displays an image from the database we can say that a TIP is displayed. 
The operator’s task is to detect the virtual object in the image and confirm this fact by pressing the button on the 
x-ray device. This increases the screeners’ awareness, as they are forced to search for prohibited items in the 
baggage image more often than is the case when the TIP system is not used. If the response is correct, the system 
confirms that the screener has detected the TIP and records his/her reaction time. In case of no reaction, the system 
informs about an error and records this fact for further analysis. Such data is the basis for the research presented in 
the following sections. As a measure of type A errors we assumed the ratio of the number of unrecognized TIPs to 
the total number of displayed TIPs. As a measure of type B errors we assumed ratio of the number of false positives 
(the number of luggage mistakenly identified as containing prohibited items) for all checked baggage. 
To find the relation between the number of errors and reaction time and experience, measurements were carried 
out for three employees who had just begun working as security screeners. Table 1 presents data on number of 
screened bags, number of TIPs displayed and the percentage of type A and type B errors in relation to number of 
TIPs and number of bags respectively. Table 2 presents the data on the number of type A and type B errors and also 
the screener’s reaction time when committing both types of errors. The graphical representation of two relationships 
is presented on Figure 1 and Figure 2. 
Table 1. Percentage of errors made by security screeners with respect to the number of months of work experience. 
Month Number of TIPs Number of bags Percentage of type A errors Percentage of type B errors 
1 61 3185 62,30% 2,07% 
2 261 10 625 39,85% 1,62% 
3 199 8577 25,13% 3,96% 
4 218 9058 23,85% 2,40% 
5 186 8271 20,97% 1,09% 
6 242 10 158 18,60% 0,99% 
7 193 8060 24,35% 0,99% 
8 195 8507 14,36% 1,16% 
9 174 7198 17,24% 0,93% 
10 188 8184 15,43% 0,75% 
11 127 7809 18,11% 0,78% 
12 85 6131 23,53% 0,46% 
 
The measurement results clearly show that the number of errors (both type A and type B) committed by 
inexperienced security screeners during their first months of work is large. The number of errors decreases over time 
as the employees gain experience. It can be noticed that the error rate decreases to an acceptable according to the 
regulations level after about five months and it can be said that the rate stabilises after about eight months. 
Some interesting facts can be seen from the analysis of response times while making errors. Firstly, security 
screener while committing an error of type A responds much faster. It is clear that the decision to qualify a bag as 
free from prohibited items is almost automatic. Inexperienced screener analyzes baggage longer, as can be seen from 
Figure 2, but after about 6 months of work this time is twice-three times shorter. It is equal to the response time for 
the entire population of screeners, which results from our other research. On the other hand, while committing an 
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error of type B response time is much longer. It can be concluded that, if the displayed image of the piece of 
baggage is questionable and its assessment makes some trouble, the screener (as evidenced by the longer time of 
analysis) prefers to mark the bag as potentially dangerous and to perform the manual inspection. In the case of 
committing a type B error, the reaction time is not as unequivocally dependant on the screener’s experience as in the 
case of type A error. Table 2 shows that after a year of work experience this time increases. This time, in the general 
case, can be even greater as demonstrated by our study on a larger sample of screeners (including very experienced).  
Table 2. Security screeners reaction time with respect to the number of months of work experience and type of error. 
Month Number of type A errors Number of type B errors Reaction time (type A error) [s] Reaction time (type B error) [s] 
1 38 66 2.8 4.5 
2 104 172 2.4 4 
3 50 340 2.2 4.1 
4 52 217 1.9 4.2 
5 39 90 1.7 3.9 
6 45 101 1.3 3.6 
7 47 80 1.4 3.9 
8 28 99 1.0 3.9 
9 30 67 1.2 3.9 
10 29 61 1.0 4.6 
11 23 61 1.3 4.9 
12 20 28 1.2 5.2 
 
 
   
 Fig. 1. The relation between the percentage of type B errors  Fig. 2. The relation between reaction type during type A 
 and screener’s work experience (Table 1). errors and screener’s work experience (Table 2). 
5. Relation between the screener’s errors and TIP frequency 
The frequency of the stimulus, defined as the TIP appearance in the x-ray image, has been listed in Section 3 as 
one of the causes of errors. In order to find the proper frequency of TIPs an experiment involving 93 security 
screeners from Katowice–Pyrzowice International Airport was conducted. Results averaged for all employees 
together, show no statistical relation between the frequency of errors and the TIP frequency. However, closer 
analysis of the results of measurements allows for the identification of four groups of screeners: 
1. Those who commit few type A errors and few type B errors. These persons have an ideal profile for the 
security screener position.  
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2. Persons of a precautionary nature. They commit few errors of type A and a lot of type B errors. These 
screeners are carrying out a rational principle: ‘better express doubts and proceed with manual baggage check 
than overlook the forbidden item’. 
3. Persons restrained in identifying suspicious baggage. They commit a lot of type A and few of type B errors. 
Doing so may result from both a psychological determinants but also from difficulties in the perception of 
images of prohibited items. 
4. Those who commit a lot of type A and type B errors. This type of person is the least useful in the security 
screener position. Employees in this group indicate baggage for manual control at random, without a deeper 
analysis of the image from the TIP system. 
For the presentation of the dependence of the number of errors on the frequency of the stimulus, representatives 
of the above four groups were chosen. Sample measurements from the period January–April 2014 are presented in 
Table 3 and in Figures 3 and 4. 
Table 3. Characteristics of errors made by the screeners from different groups. 
Screener type Number of TIPs Number of bags Percentage of type A errors Percentage of type B errors 
Group 1  161 9739 7.5 0.50 
Group 2 172 10678 15.1 2.20 
Group 3 185 11187 38.9 0.67 
Group 4 257 16943 26.5 3.27 
 
 
             
 Fig. 3. Relation between the TIP frequency and type A errors. Fig. 4. Relation between the TIP frequency and type B errors. 
The graphs in Figures 3 and 4 show the results for the usable range of TIP frequencies, i.e. from 1% to 3%. Some 
interesting regularities can be observed: 
• Screeners committing a small number of type A errors (group 1 and 2) are characterized by an increase in the 
number of errors with increasing TIP frequency. For those who commit a large number of type A errors 
(group 3 and 4), this relation is reversed: the higher the TIP frequency the lower the number of errors. 
• Screeners committing a small number of type B errors (group 1 and 3) are characterized by an increase in the 
frequency of errors with increasing TIP frequency. Similarly, screeners with a high number of type B errors 
(group 2 and 4), record its’ decrease with increasing TIP frequency. 
Psychological analysis of the reasons of such screeners’ behaviour goes beyond the scope of this work. The 
conclusion of this analysis is that in the general case neither very low nor very high TIP frequency is appropriate. 
Most preferred is the intermediate TIP frequency, about 2%. Only when we know to which of the four identified 
groups the screener belongs, we can select individual TIP frequency to him/her. 
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6. The overall assessment of the effectiveness of detecting prohibited items 
The study (Wells, Bradley 2012) presents a method of SSc assessment consisting of analysis of the relationship 
between the probability of prohibited articles detection (dependent on type A errors) on the frequency of false 
alarms (type B errors). This method assumes that measurements of prohibited items detection rate are performed in 
laboratory conditions. In our work, we used this method, but in real conditions. The most important difference is that 
in real conditions the number of bags containing a TIP in its image is much lower than in the laboratory. In addition 
the screeners work under tension and stress, which can affect their performance. From the effectiveness of detection 
point of view, the above mentioned relation for a small number of type B errors is the most important. The results of 
the analysis, based on measurements performed in Katowice-Pyrzowice Airport from January to April 2012 is 
shown in Figure 5. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Comparison of typical levels of SSc work effectiveness. 
 
As one can see SSc in Katowice–Pyrzowice make a small number of false alarms and have an excellent level of 
prohibited items detection, comparable to the theoretical values, those obtained in laboratory conditions. It can be 
assumed that a large role in this excellent result is played by the SSc awareness as to the role that baggage screening 
plays to air transport safety (Mearns et al. 2013). It is worth noting that in real conditions only this most important 
part of the relationship presented in Figure 5 can be measured. 
7. Conclusions 
1. The paper presents an analysis of the dependence of the number and types of errors made by the security 
screeners on their experience and the frequency of the stimulus, represented by an image of a prohibited 
object. The basic data for analysis are measurements of errors committed by the screeners. They were 
recorded in real conditions, using the Threat Image Projection (TIP) telematic support system. We conclude 
that the TIP system is a great source of knowledge about the security screeners work, while also allowing for 
continuous improvement of their skills.  
2. One of the main results of the research is finding the relation between the screeners’ experience and the 
number of errors they commit. This allowed for an indication that after about 5 months a screener reaches 
such a level of experience which may entitle him/her to work independently on baggage image analysis. We 
can also conclude that the screener, which has about nine months of experience, reaches the operating 
parameters which allow one to qualify him/her to fully experienced.  
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3. The second result was to determine the relation between the TIP frequency and the number of type A and type 
B errors. This dependence on a general level does not exist. However, the identification of four groups of 
screeners, characterized respectively by low and high number of errors of type A and B, allows observing 
some interesting relations. This makes it possible to say that neither very low nor very high TIP frequency is 
appropriate in the general case. However, with the knowledge how effective the screener’s work is (i.e. to 
which of the four groups he/she belongs) it is possible to select TIP frequency best for him/her. 
4. Screener’s response time differs substantially when type A and type B errors are committed. The decision to 
qualify a bag as secure is usually taken quickly. When the image analysis takes longer it is more likely that a 
type B error appears.  
5. The dependence of the response time during a type A error on the experience is consistent with the 
dependence on type A errors number. However, the increase of the experience does not affect the response 
time during type B errors. 
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